Alternative routes to Hormuz for oil and gas

The disruption of maritime transit through the Strait of Hormuz has once again put the Middle Eastern energy system under pressure. Although the region has some infrastructure to divert part of its crude oil and gas exports, the actual capacity of these routes remains limited compared to the volume that normally crosses this strategic passage.

Furthermore, the operational closure of Hormuz exposes an underlying problem: existing pipelines help alleviate pressure but do not fully replace the Gulf’s main energy corridor. The result is a more fragile logistics chain, higher transportation costs, and additional pressure on international prices.

Alternative routes to Hormuz: capacity and limits

Firstly, Saudi Arabia maintains the region’s most robust alternative with its East-West pipeline. This infrastructure connects the country’s eastern fields to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea and can move up to 7 million barrels per day, although effective export capacity is lower due to the availability of terminals and vessels.

From Yanbu, shipments can head to Europe via the Suez Canal or down toward Asia through Bab el-Mandeb. However, this exit is not risk-free either. Insecurity in the Red Sea and attacks on ships in that area show that changing routes does not eliminate the problem, but rather shifts it to another sensitive corridor.

United Arab Emirates gains margin outside the strait

On the other hand, the United Arab Emirates has a specific geographical advantage thanks to the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline. Operated by ADNOC, this system carries crude from Abu Dhabi to Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman, allowing oil to be loaded outside the Strait of Hormuz.

Thus, the country manages to maintain an alternative export route with an estimated capacity of between 1.5 and 1.8 million barrels per day. Even so, this route does not completely resolve regional exposure. Fujairah has gained importance as a storage and bunkering hub, but its capacity remains small compared to the total volume of the Gulf and it has also suffered security impacts.

Iraq diversifies with several outlets but on a smaller scale

Meanwhile, Iraq relies on more fragmented options. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which connects northern Iraq with the Turkish port of Ceyhan, is once again a relief valve for part of its exports. Its reactivation allows barrels to be moved toward the Mediterranean, although the available volume remains modest compared to the country’s total exportable capacity.

In parallel, Baghdad is studying or reactivating other land exits and connection projects with Jordan and Oman. The problem is that many of these proposals progress slowly due to costs, security, and political difficulties. Consequently, Iraq has partial alternatives, but none substantially change its dependence on the Gulf.

Iran has Jask but still with limited margin

In the Iranian case, the Jask terminal and the Goreh-Jask pipeline represent the clearest bet to bypass Hormuz. The infrastructure was designed to move around 1 million barrels per day toward the Gulf of Oman, opening a direct exit to the outside.

However, its development does not yet allow it to compensate for a prolonged closure of the strait. Tests carried out show progress, but the terminal still does not offer all the functionality necessary to absorb a large-scale disruption in regional energy trade.

Future projects remain far from offering a quick solution

In addition to the routes already in operation, proposals such as a pipeline between Iraq and Oman, another between Iraq and Jordan, and even the idea of a canal connecting the Gulf with the Sea of Oman are on the table. On paper, these projects would expand the logistical resilience of the Middle East.

However, their execution would require years of development, billions of dollars, and complex political agreements. Therefore, today they remain long-term options and not real answers for an immediate disruption of traffic through Hormuz.

Hormuz remains the key point of the energy system

Ultimately, the regional network does allow for the redirection of part of the oil and gas, but not the replacement of the volume that normally passes through the strait. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates offer the most useful exits, Iraq adds complementary routes, and Iran is moving forward with its own option, although none of them alone reaches the scale of the affected corridor.

Likewise, the crisis confirms that the problem is not the total absence of alternatives, but the lack of sufficient capacity to replace a bottleneck through which a decisive part of the world’s supply flows. As long as that gap persists, any disruption in Hormuz will continue to impact energy security and global prices.

Source: Reuters

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